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AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
By

THOMAS RAEBURN WHITE 'I

Changes in the fundamental law of American states as laid down
in their constitutions have been very numerous, especially within the
last half century. The validity of some of these changes or proposed
changes has been challenged in the courts; but in view of the controlling
influence of public opinion, which in the last analysis must make the
decision, the courts have been very liberal*in sustaining amendments
or revisions, even though irregularly made, which have been approved
by the people. This situation has led to some confusion of authority.
A discussion of constitutional amendment and revision in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review is particularly timely in view of the
prevailing agitation for a convention to revise the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which became effective on January 1, 1874, and to which
fifty-three amendments have been made and many others proposed.'
Written constitutions setting up governments in the colonies were
adopted in compliance with a resolution passed by the Continental Congress on May 15, 1776, as follows:
"RESOLVED, That it be recommended to the respective conventions of the united colonies, where no government sufficient
to the exigencies of their affairs has been hitherto established, to
adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of
their constituents in particular and America in general." 2

It is impossible in a brief article such as this to recount the experiences
of the different colonies in following the advice given them by the Continental Congress, but, as the action taken in Pennsylvania was typical
and gave rise to some of the legal questions hereafter to be considered,
there will be a more detailed examination of Pennsylvania's constitutional history.
The first Constitution of Pennsylvania was prepared by a convention of delegates elected under the direction of an unofficial body apt LL. B. 1899, University of Pennsylvania; B. L. 1896, LL. D. 1935, Earlham
College. Member of the Philadelphia Bar. Author of COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA and of articles in various legal publications.
1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the experiences of constitution
making and revision in all of the states of this country and the hundreds of decisions
on various points involved, but a few fundamental principles may be profitably examined.
2. PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790 37
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(1132)

1952]

STATE CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT AND REVISION

1133

pointed by the Committees of Public Safety of the various counties of
the province. This convention met in the State House at Philadelphia
on July 15, 1776, under the chairmanship of Benjamin Franklin, and
prepared a constitution which was declared to be effective without submission to the people.3 The committee which arranged for the election
of delegates had no authority to do so, but the constitution enacted by
this convention was accepted and acted under during the rather brief
period of its existence. The initial constitutions of the various states
were promulgated in much the same way. They were all revolutionary
in character since none of them was the offspring of any previously
existing government.4
Every constitution as originally adopted or later amended contains provisions furnishing the means whereby it may be amended.
The great majority provide that specific amendments may be made
through proposals by the legislatures and approval by vote of the people. Some, but not all, provide that conventions may be called for a
general revision of the constitution. Only the Constitution of New
Hampshire omits to provide for specific amendment, although it does
provide a method whereby a convention may be called for a general
revision. The most common method of making specific amendments is
that of the present Constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides that a
proposal for amendment must be passed by two legislatures and approved by vote of the people before becoming effective.
In several states, amendments may also be proposed by initiative
petitions signed by a designated number of voters and submitted to the
people without reference to the legislature. If approved, the amendments become part of the constitution.' The details with respect to the
manner in which such amendments may be proposed, advertised and
approved vary in different states, but the effect is the same. It has
been held, however, that authority to propose specific amendments does
not permit a legislature to prepare a completely revised constitution and
submit it to the people for adoption. Such a revision may be prepared
only by a convention of delegates elected for the purpose."
3. Id. at 45 and 66.
4. Many constitutions were irregularly adopted about the time of the Civil War.
It is beyond the scope of this article to treat of them or of constitutions adopted by
territories seeking admission as states.
5. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. In Massachusetts
an amendment may be proposed by an initiative petition, but also must be approved
by the legislature.
6. Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912) ; Livermore v. Waite, 102
Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424 (1894). For a more complete discussion of this question
with reference to the various provisions in constitutions of the different states, see
DODD, TE REvisioN AND AmENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS c. 4 (1910) ; HOAR,
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The constitutional method whereby specific amendments may be
made must beccarefully followed 7 because the legislature, or a group of
electors signing an initiative petition, when proposing amendments to
the constitution, is acting as an agent of the people, whose directions
as contained in the constitution must be strictly observed.8 This power
to propose amendments is not a legislative power; therefore, resolutions
of the legislature proposing amendments to the constitution need not
be approved by the governor although he has the power of giving or
. withholding approval of ordinary acts of legislation.9 If the constitution does not contain any provision whereby specific amendments may
be proposed by the legislature or by initiative petition, no amendments
may be proposed in those manners. These principles are well understood, and do not require further discussion.
It is now well settled by the weight of American authority that a
provision in a constitution that specific amendments may be proposed
by the legislature or by initiative petitidn is not an exclusive method
of amendment but that the legislature may, whether or not authorized
by the constitution, provide by law for the calling of a convention to
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS C.

6 (1917) ;

JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

c. 8 (4th ed. 1887).
There is, however, one instance in which the method condemned in Ellingham
v. Dye, supra, was used. The legislature of Virginia provided that a commission of
seven members should be appointed by the Governor to study the constitution and
propose a detailed revision thereof. This was done, and the legislature under the
power to propose specific amendments proposed that the constitution as revised and
amended by this commission should become the constitution of the state. This constitution was approved by the people in 1929 without the calling of any convention. In
Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945), the court referred to the manner
in which this constitution had been adopted with apparent approval. This reference
was, however, only dictum as the legality of the constitution of 1928 was not in issue.
Hooker, J., dissenting in the case of Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich.
337, 115 N.W. 429 (1908), said that where the legislature was permitted to propose
amendments it could "practically submit a complete constitution entirely new without
the intervention of a convention." This observation, however, is contrary to the
weight of authority, and must be considered to be erroneous. See, however, Wheeler
v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
7. Livermore v. Waite, smpra note 6; Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W.
738 (1883) ; Com. v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 164 Atl. 615 (1932) ; Johnson v. Craft,
205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375 (1921) ; Larkin v. Gronna, 69 N.D. 234, 285 N.W. 59
(1939) ; Barto v. Himrod, 4 Selden 433 (N.Y. 1833). If the proposals of specific
amendments do not conform strictly to the powers conferred upon the legislature
in that connection by the constitution, the courts will enjoin their submission to the
people or even their operation, in clear cases, after the people have approved them.
For an excellent discussion on this question see DoDm, op. cit. smprat note 6, at 209
et seq. and cases cited therein.

See also HoAR, op. cit. s=pra note 6, at 149, 151.

8. The same rule prevails where the people by a constitutional provision have
delegated to the legislature the power to enact specific amendments without submission to the people. Eason v. The State, 6 Eng. 481 (Ark. 1851). There is no such
provision at the present time.
9. Commonwealth v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 410, 46 Atl. 505, 508 (1900); Carton
v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337, 341, 115 N.W. 429, 431 (1908) ; Johnson v.
Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375 (1921); JAMESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 586.
See also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 331 n. (U.S. 1793) ; Murphy Chair
Company v. Attorney General, 148 Mich. 563, 112 N.W. 127 (1907).
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revise the constitution."0 It is a more difficult question whether, if a
constitution provides a method whereby a convention may be called, it
may be called in a different way. For example, if the constitution provides for the calling of a convention by a council of censors, as did the
Pennsylvania constitution of 1776, may the legislature act directly
without regard to the action or non-action of the council of censors?
Or, if the constitution provides that a constitutional convention may be
called only after the people have approved such action by vote, may the
legislature provide for the calling of a convention without submitting
the question to the people?
The first constitution of Pennsylvania (1776) provided in its last
section for the election of a Council of Censors, whose duty it should
be to inquire whether the constitution had been "preserved inviolate,"
whether the legislative and executive branches of the government had
exercised other or greater powers than they were entitled to under
the constitution, whether public taxes had been laid and collected justly,
and whether public moneys had been spent properly. If it found that
the constitution had been infringed in the matters referred to, the
Council was given power to call a convention by vote of two-thirds of
its number, the convention to have the power to amend and revise
the constitution."
The Council of Censors met, but after a long and rather acrimonious debate adjourned without calling a convention as its advocates
were unable to secure the necessary two-thirds vote. On March 24,
1789, the General Assembly passed by a substantial majority a resolution declaring that in the opinion of the House (then the only legislative body) alterations and amendments to the constitution of the
state were immediately necessary and recommending that a convention
10. JAMESON, op. cit. upra note 6, at 211-212, 388-389; State v. Dah, 6 N.D.
81, 68 N.W. 418 (1896); Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874); HOAR, op. cit. slipra
note 6, at 48. There is some expression of opinion to the contrary. Thus the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in an advisory opinion, 6 Cushing 573 (Mass. 1833),
intimated that a constitution cannot be amended except in the manner provided
therein. However, the court made a reservation: it said that it was not the understanding of the court that the House of Representatives had requested their opinion
"upon the natural right of the people in cases of great emergency or upon the obvious
failure of their existing constitution to accomplish the objects for which it was designed to provide for the amendment or alteration of their fundamental laws." This
observation is interesting in connection with the discussion of the power of a legislature to provide for a constitutional convention although another method of calling
a convention is provided by the constitution, or even in case it is forbidden. In another advisory opinion, 14 R.I. 649 (1883), the judges of the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island said that the mode provided in the constitution for amendment is the
only one which can be constitutionally used. These expressions of opinion, however,
have been disregarded by later cases holding the contrary on this question. See
In re Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 178 Atl. 433 (1935), in which the previous expression of opinion by Rhode Island judges was held erroneous.
11. PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, 64
(1825).
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should. be called for the purpose of "revising, altering and amending
the Constitution of the State." 12 It also requested the Supreme Executive Council (at that time there was no governor) to promulgate
this recommendation to the people in such manner as should seem most
expedient. On September 15, 1789, the General Assembly, reciting
that it had taken the opinion of the people (although in an informal
way), and being satisfied that a majority of the people were desirous
of exercising the right of self-government by revising the constitution,
adopted a resolution to the effect that a convention to amend and revise the constitution sl-ould be called; that the convention should consist of the same number of persons as constituted the General Assembly,
these persons to be elected in the same manner as members of the Assembly; and that it would be "expedient, just and reasonable that"
the proposed constitution or amendments when prepared should be
published four months before being confirmed to allow examination
by the people. 3 A large minority dissented vigorously to this action
on two grounds: first, that the house, being "delegated for the special
purpose of legislation," "was not competent to the subject"; and
second, that the constitution itself provided a method of constitutional
revision, which they deemed to be exclusive."
The convention was duly organized, sat from November 24, 1789,
until February 26, 1790, and then adjourned until August 9, 1790, in
order that the constitution prepared by it might be published for the
consideration of the people. The convention met again in August.
made a few amendments to the draft as previously published, and adjourned sine die on September 2, 1790, after providing the "order of
procession for the proclamation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." '5 This constitution was never submitted
to the people for approval. In explaining its action in ignoring the
provision of the Constitution of 1776, the General Assembly recited
that the mode of proceeding by the Council of Censors was "not only
unequal and unnecessarily expensive but too dilatory." 10
12. Id. at 129.
13. Id. at 133-136. One of the leading members of the Assembly, William Lewis,
objected to the provision fixing the time during which the amendments and alterations should be published as he thought such matters should be determined by the
convention itself. It might think more or less time was desirable, and should not be
controlled by the legislature because, he said, "The convention must be chosen by the
people in whom alone the authority is lodged and will derive all powers from them.
They will set, and they ought to act, both as to adjournments and in all other respects independent of this house and should not in the one case any more than in
others be influenced by it."
14. Id. at 136.
15. Id. at 295-296.
16. Id. at 133.
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This Pennsylvania convention, as well as similar ones in Delaware and Maryland, is considered illegitimate by judge Jameson.17
However, it may be said in opposition to his view that as the supreme
power of government resides in the body of the people and always
remains there,' 8 they may act otherwise than as provided in the constitution if the means provided therein prove to be unworkable. It
was said in an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts '9 that "upon the obvious failure of their existing constitution
to accomplish the objects for which it was designed," the people
might "provide for the amendment or alteration of their fundamental
laws." 20 On principle, it would seem to follow that even if the
constitution should provide that no convention could be called, except after a favorable vote of the people, it could be called by the legislature in an emergency without submitting the question to the people.
Since the supreme power always remains with the people and is never
surrendered by them, even temporarily, it might be held that they
would have the power to act through the legislature as their agent
notwithstanding their previous restriction of the legislature's power.
It is very doubtful whether such a question will ever arise, as a positive
prohibition in the constitution would probably be observed both by the
legislature and by the people acting through an initiative petition.
An interesting case which has a bearing on this point is Bennett
v. Jackson.2 An act passed by the Indiana General Assembly in 1913
had submitted to the electors of the state at the general election of
1914 the question whether a constitutional convention should be called,
and they had voted against it. Three years later the legislature, ignoring this vote and not resubmitting the question to the people, provided
for the calling of a convention. The majority of the court held that
the Assembly could .not call a convention in any case without first submitting the matter to the voters of the state and receiving an affirmative answer and that, therefore, the Assembly could not call a convention against the will of the people as expressed in the earlier vote. The
17. JAMESO N, op. cit. supra note 6, at 216.
18. See remarks of James Wilson in Pennsylvania debates on adoption of Federal
Constitution, 2 ELLior's DEBATES 433, 459 (2d ed. 1836), and his opinion in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 457 (U.S. 1793).

19. See note 10 supra.
20. 6 Cushing 573 (Mass. 1833). Thirty-four states now contain provisions in
their constitutions which provide both for specific amendments in the manner above
described and also a method whereby conventions may be called by action of the legislature. These states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
21. 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921 (1917).
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court's opinion seems to have been based mainly upon what it erroneously thought was a universal custom to submit to the people the
question whether a convention should be called before actually calling
it. There was a very able dissenting opinion which, it is submitted,
expresses the correct view. This opinion pointed out that the Constitution of Indiana did not prescribe the manner in which a convention should be called or provide that the people must first approve it,
and maintained that the court had no authority to restrict the action
of the Assembly, which was the only department "authorized to speak
for the people upon this subject and to point out a mode for the expression of their will." The dissenting opinion further maintained
that the popular vote against a convention was to be considered by the
Assembly, but could not prevent it, as the agent of the people, from
calling a convention.
Where the constitution expressly provides that the legislature
cannot call a convention until a favorable vote has been received, it
may be said that, except in case of an emergency, this restriction would
be observed by the legislature. However, the vote of the people in any
such case is not a positive command to the legislature to call a convention,22 nor does it restrict the convention's power unless the act submitting the question to the people contains provisions which limit the
convention to amending one or more designated sections of the constitution or prohibit it from amending others.
It has become quite common for the legislature before calling a
convention to submit to the people the question whether such a convention should be called, for the vote of the people is an indication
whether they would approve amendments if made. Since a vote
against a convention would suggest that its work might be rejected,
it is in the interest of economy that the will of the people should be
ascertained, if possible, before the convention is actually called together. The statement in the majority opinion in Bennett v. Jackson23
that in no case can a convention be called unless the people have voted
in favor of it is clearly erroneous. There are no authorities which
sustain this view. As the dissenting opinion in Bennett v. Jackson
indicates, if the constitution contains nothing on the subject, the power
of the legislature in this respect is unlimited.
It is, therefore, apparent that the people have wide latitude in
determining how they shall exercise their reserved power to change
22. In three states, New York, Michigan and Missouri, after a favorable vote
of the people, the convention assembles without further action of the legislature, details of the election of delegates being contained in the constitution itself.
23. 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921 (1917). See also JAMPSON, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 600-601.
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the fundamental law. Of course, they cannot do it in a spontaneous
manner, but only through some agent authorized to speak for all of
them.2" In Wells v. Bain2 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
"When a law becomes the instrumental process of amendment it is not because the legislature possesses any inherent power
to change the existing constitution through a convention, but
because it is the only means through which an authorized consent
of the whole people of the entire state can be lawfully obtained
in a state of peace." 20
It may be added that in states having the initiative and referendum
a petition filed by a certain percentage of the voters may become "the
instrumental process of amendment."
In three states, Michigan, New York and Missouri, the constitution itself directs that at stated intervals an election shall be held to
determine whether a convention shall be called, and if the vote is favorable the convention shall be held without further action by the legislature. The constitution also provides the manner in which the delegates shall be elected, the powers which the convention shall have with
respect to its organization, etc., but imposes no limitations on the convention's authority except that proposed amendinents must be submitted
to the people for approval. Legislative action in these states is required
merely to submit to the voters the question whether a convention shall
be called.
A question then arises as to the powers of such a convention. Is
it omnipotent (except as controlled by the Constitution of the United
States), or is it limited by the terms of the act or the constitutional
provision whereby it was called into existence or by some other authority?
There are expressions of opinion, worthy of consideration, that a
convention lawfully called to revise the constitution of a state is sovereign, and not subject to any restraint which may have been contained in the laws calling it into existence. Thus in the New York
constitutional convention of 1821 Mr. Livingston, one of the delegates,
in reply to an argument that the powers of the convention were limited
said:
24. An attempt to establish a constitution by a convention not called by the' legislature but chosen through spontaneous action by the people gave rise to Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849), clearly demonstrates that a convention
cannot be legally called in that manner.
25. 75 Pa. 39 (1873).
26. Id. at 47.
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They are present by their

No restriction limits our proceedings
are standing upon the foundations of society." 27

....

Sir, we

This question was debated at length in the Pennsylvania convention of 1873. The act calling the convention and providing for the
election of delegates had stipulated that it should have only certain
powers and no others. The prevailing view of the convention was that
these restrictions could be disregarded, particularly in view of the fact
that when the question whether a convention should be called had been
submitted to the people they had voted in favor of it. Mr. Ellis, one
member of the convention, argued:
c*..
when the Legislature passed an act submitting the question to the people whether the Convention should assemble or
not for the purpose of' amending the Constitution of the State,
and that question was submitted to the people, the only remaining
business for the Legislature to do was to provide the means necessary for the assembling and organization of this Convention.
Look at it. If the Legislature had the power to say, 'you shall
not touch the article upon the Declaration of rights,' the Legislature had the power to say, 'you shall not touch the judiciary
article.' If they had the power to say, 'you shall not touch these
two articles,' they had power to say, 'you shall not touch but one
article of the Constitution,' and thus nullify the formal judgment
of the people." 28
The contrary view was also presented, especially by Judge Black, former Attorney General of the United States, who argued that the act
calling the convention limited its power."9 Subsequently the convention adopted the Ellis view by formal resolution as follows:
27. There are other expressions of opinion worthy of note. In 1837 the Hon.
George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, prior to the meeting of the constitutional convention of 1837, wrote that in his opinion the convention when assembled would
"possess, within the territory of Pennsylvania, every attribute of absolute sovereignty,
except such as may have been yielded and are embodied in the Constitution of the
United States." In the Illinois convention of 1847, one delegate argued: "We are
the sovereignty of the State. We are what the people of the State would be, if
they were congregated here in one mass meeting. We are what Louis XIV said
he was, 'We are the State.' We can trample the Constitution under our feet as waste
paper, and no one can call us to account save the people." JAMEsoM, op., cit. Mtpr
note 6, at 303.
28. 1 DEBATEs OF THE CONSITUTONAL CONVENTION 53 et seq. (1873).
29. judge Black said: "Suppose the Legislature had seen proper to say that we
should not assemble at all, or that we should make no amendments to the Constitution-that the Constitution should stand just as it is; then the question is, whether we
could, in defiance of that mandate, assemble ourselves together in Convention, representing, as we do, the whole people of the Commonwealth, and against the will of
the people, and against the authority of the organized government now existing, proceed to alter the body of it. I say we could not do that. That would be revolutionary. Where do we get the power? Where does it come from? Nobody will
deny that we are sitting here in pursuance of certain acts of the Legislature-one
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" 'Resolved, That the constitution of the state is the only recognized form of its government, and the people having expressly
reserved to themselves the right to alter, reform, or abolish their
government in such manner as they think proper, and having in
distinct terms excepted this right out of the general powers of
government and declared that such right shall forever remain. inviolate, this convention deems it to be its duty to declare that it
is not within the power of any department to control the powers of
a convention called by the people to reform their constitution,
and that the convention, subject to the Constitution of the United
States, is answerable only to the people from whom it derived its
power.' "30

Neither of these arguments expresses the correct doctrine. The
power of the convention does not come from the legislature as argued
by Judge Black; it comes from the people and can be limited by them.3
In Woods's Appeal," the court held in part as follows:
"A convention has no inherent rights; it exercises powers
only. Delegated power defines itself. To be delegated it must
come in some adopted manner to convey it by some defined means.
This adopted manner therefore becomes the measure of the power
conferred. The right of the people is absolute in the language of
the bill of rights, 'to alter, reform or abolish their government in
such manner as they may think proper.' This right being theirs,
they may impart so much or so little of it as they shall deem expedient. It is only when they exercise this right, and not before
[that] they determine by the mode they choose to adopt, the extent of the powers they intend to delegate. Hence the argument
which imputes sovereignty to a convention, because of the reservation in the bill of rights, is utterly illogical and unsound. The
bill of rights is a reservation of rights out of the general powers
of government to themselves, but is no delegation of power to
a convention." 33
The court continued that the popular vote meant nothing more than
approval of the calling of a convention, but that when the legislature
passed an act providing for the call of the convention and the delegates
were elected by the people pursuant to the terms of that act, they
thereby conferred upon the convention the powers which the said act
which first authorized a vote by the people upon the question, and the other one which
authorized the election of delegates to the Convention. If we derive our power from
that source, is it possible that we can take it without the limitations that were imposed
upon it by those who created it? I don't think that question can be answered in any
but one way." 1 DEBATES OF THE CONSTrrUTiONAL CONVENTON' 157 (1873).

30. 8 Id. at 745.
31. See, however, JAMESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 414, apparently expressing
a contrary opinion.
32. 75 Pa. 59 (1874)
33. Id. at 69-70.
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indicated they should have and no more. As the act of the Assembly
according to which the delegates were elected provided that the Bill
of Rights should not be changed in any manner and that the work of
the convention should be submitted to the people in a certain way, it
must be considered that the delegates were elected with that understanding; consequently, the convention was limited accordingly.8 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Wells v. Bain,3 5 pursuant to this
theory, enjoined the holding of an election to determine the approval
or disapproval of the work of the convention in a manner different from
that prescribed by the act of the Assembly.
Judge Jameson, apparently not approving the theory of the Pennsylvania court, seems to argue that conventions are subject to the control of the legislature calling them.3 Dodd criticizes these views as
going too far. He believes that the constitutional convention is a
"regular organ of the State . . . neither sovereign nor subordinate
to the legislature but independent within its proper sphere." '7
It is submitted that neither of these authors states the correct
theory of the relation between the convention and the legislature. The
views expressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wells v.
Bain, " and Woods's Appeal,89 seem to be supported by the better
reasoning: the convention is not subordinate to the legislature, but
if the legislature in calling the convention provides that it shall be restricted in power, and delegates are elected pursuant to the act, the restraint on the power of the convention is really imposed not by the
legislature but by the people. That the legislature does not have control of the convention is demonstrated by the fact that there are no
cases which sustain any legislative action limiting the convention in any
way after it has been called together. The correct principle appears
to be that there are no limitations on the power of a convention except those imposed by the people themselves, either by approving an
act proposing to call a convention with limited powers or in connection with the election of delegates."0
34. T-o A, op. cit. sapra note 6, criticizes this decision on the ground that it does
not accord with the facts. He apparently is of the opinion that the election of a
delegate pursuant to an act of assembly limiting the powers of a convention does not
involve an approval of this limitation by the people. It is submitted, however, that
the view of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is the better one.
35. 75 Pa. 39 (1873).
36. JA.-MESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 356 et seq.
37. DODD, op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 80.
38. 75 Pa. 39 (1873).
39. 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
40. See opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court of New York, reported in
JAMESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 663. See also Sproule v. Fredericks, 69 Miss.
898, 11 So. 472 (1892) ; McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Tex. 34 (1849).

1952]

STATE CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT AND REVISION

1143

It may also be stated as a general principle that the convention is
independent of any restrictions on its power contained in a previous
constitution, such as a provision that the bill of rights should never be
changed. The very purpose of a convention is to revise and amend the
previous constitution, and nothing therein contained can prevent its
doing so if the people have conferred plenary power upon the convention.
In this connection, however, a distinction should be made between
directions contained in a previous constitution with respect to the
manner in which amendments may be made or a convention called and
restrictions on the power of the convention itself with respect to the
amendments or revisions which it may make. As has been pointed
out, constitutional provisions with respect to the manner in which
specific amendments may be made or conventions may be called must
be followed unless under existing circumstances this course of action
appears to be impossible or at least impracticable. However, no matter what its provisions may be, a constitution cannot prevent the people,
in whom the supreme power always remains, from amending or revising it in such manner as they may determine, either through specific
amendments or by means of a convention. In Livermore v. Waite,
the court said:
the constitution provides two methods by which
changes may be effected in that instrument, one by a convention
of delegates chosen by the people for the express purpose of revising the entire instrument, and the other through the adoption
by the people of propositions for specific amendments that have
been previously submitted to it by two-thirds of the members of
each branch of the legislature. It can be neither revised nor
amended except in the manner prescribed by itself, and the power
which it has conferred upon the legislature in reference to proposed amendments, as well as to calling a convention, must be
strictly pursued. Under the first of these methods the entire
sovereignty of the people is represented in the convention. The
character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that
body is freed from any limitations other than those contained in
the constitution of the United States." "'
The act of the legislature in proposing specific amendments is not
legislative in character and does not require the approval of the governor. There is no definite ruling that the act calling a convention need
not be approved by the governor,4 2 and there are instances in which
41. 102 Cal. 113, 117, 36 Pac. 424, 425 (1894). See also Larkin v. Gronna, 69
N.D. 234, 285 N.W. 59 (1939); Downs v. City of Birmingham, 240 Ala. 177, 198
So. 231 (1940).
42. But see Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337, 341, 115 N.W. 429,
433 (1908).
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such approval has been given. Although the question is a very narrow
one, it would seem that an act of legislation providing for a convention
contains so many provisions of a legislative character that it should
be approved by the governor, although it is hardly possible that the
governor could block the calling of a convention if the legislature, acting
as the agent of the people, desired to call it. The practice seems to be
that the governor signs bills of this character."
Whether he could
prevent the calling of a convention by vetoing the bill must await the
44
determination of the courts if such a case arises.
Many constitutions provide that any amendments proposed by a
convention shall have no validity until approved by the people.4 5 In
the absence of any such provision, either in the old constitution or in
the act calling the convention, it was held in Staples v. Gilmer4 that
a convention can enact an amendment without submitting it to the
people. The Constitution of Virginia at that time provided that the
legislature could call a convention without any restriction of its powers
or as to the manner in which it could be called. The legislature called a
convention for the sole purpose of changing the qualifications of electors
so as to permit soldiers to vote. In order to save time, the convention
met, made the desired amendment, and immediately declared it to be
operative without submitting it to the people. This action was sustained by the court in a well-considered opinion.
Jameson argues 47 strongly that the view of this case would make
the convention a despot; that it would be better to have an absolute
monarch because his rule would be "'tempered,' if not otherwise, 'by
assassination,' into a sort of practical responsibility to the people";
that "to entrust such a body, without check, with the enactment of its
fundamental law, would be but to discount the national life,-to antedate that final overthrow which history shows to be in store for all
43. But see the Constitutions of Alabama and Delaware, which provide that
resolutions proposing amendments or calling a convention shall not be submitted to the
Governor for approval.
44. See an interesting discussion in Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71
P.2d 140 (1937).
45. Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
46. 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945). As shown above, the Pennsylvania Convention of 1789 promulgated the Constitution of 1790 without submitting it to the
people. See also Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613 (1873). DODD, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 64-66, mentions several other instances in which constitutions were enacted
by conventions without submission to the people, but some of them were reconstruction constitutions. The Constitution of Alabama, § 286, appears to give a convention full power to make any changes in the constitution it may agree upon without
submission to the people.
47. JAMESOiN, op. cit. mupra note 6, at 415.
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nations." As support, he cites Parker v. Commonwealth48 which,
however, related only49 to the validity of a local option law and has
since been overruled.

It is submitted that Judge Jameson's view is too extreme and not
in accordance with the best authority. If the people elect delegates to
a convention that is authorized to revise the constitution without limitations, it would seem that the convention is restrained only by the Constitution of the United States.
Thus far we have discussed the power of a constitutional convention legally called to revise the constitution. Such power relates
strictly to changes in the fundamental law, which where they have to
be submitted to the people are of no validity until approved by them.
There is, however, the further question whether the convention has
any ordinary power of legislation. It may be stated as a general principle that it has not. A convention is called together for the exclusive
purpose of proposing or making changes in the fundamental law which,
when they become effective, will control the legislature and other organs
of the government. It clearly has no further powers, and if it attempts
to interfere with the existing departments of government, legislative,
executive or judicial, or to perform their functions, it goes beyond its
authority. Even where it is under no limitations and its proposals
need not be approved by the people, it has no legislative or executive
power. There have been, however, a number of instances in which
conventions have attempted, in effect, to legislate through "ordinances." On principle, such "ordinances" are not within the powers
of the convention and ordinarily have been held void, but political
considerations enter into the decisions to such extent that the cases
are in much confusion.5 0
Particularly in recent years, some conventions have included in
proposed constitutions provisions which are really legislative in character. When these proposals have become a part of the constitution,
they are, of course, binding on the people of the state. This tendency
is unfortunate, as provisions of this.kind do not properly belong in a
constitution.5 1 Legislative provisions contained in a constitution are,
48. 6 Pa. 507 (1847).
49. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873).
50. It would serve no useful purpose to review the many instances where legislation or interference with the executive department has been attempted. They are collected by HoAa, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 11. In most instances the courts held such
action void.
51. Several constitutions which have been adopted or amended in recent years
are very long and contain many provisions which are legislative in character. In
the compilation entitled CoNsnrroTiois oF THE STATES ANDO UNIT=D STATES, published in 1938 by the New York State Constitutional Committee, the Constitution
of California covers 96 pages, the Constitution of Louisiana 130 pages, the Constitu-
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of course, not repealable by the legislature. This leads to difficulties
where changes of condition require, or at least make desirable, changes
wlich the legislature cannot make.
A convention, however, does have power to provide for its own
organization and accommodations, such as a meeting place; to provide
for the appointment and compensation of its own officers and employees; and to provide for the printing and preservation of its records.
In the absence of any limitation on its power in this respect, the convention may also make the necessary arrangements for submitting to
52
the people the question whether or not its work shall be approved,
and may adopt a schedule for putting the constitution into effect. In
Goodrich v. Moore, a state printer disputed the right of the convention
to appoint a competitor to print the records of the convention. The
court said that this matter was within the power of the convention:
"But even had the Legislature intended and attempted to
claim and exercise the act of providing a printer for the Constitutional Convention it would have been unauthorized and unwarrantable interference with the rights of that body. The admission of such a right in the legislature would place the Convention
under its entire control leaving it without authority even to appoint or to elect its own officers, or adopt measures for the transaction of its legitimate business .

.

.

. It is the highest legisla-

tive assembly recognized in law, vested with the right of enacting
or framing the supreme law of the State. It must have plenary
power for this and over all the incidents thereof." 11
There is some difference of opinion on the question of drawing
money from the state treasury for the expenses of the convention. As
the treasurer is under the control of the officers of the state under the
old constitution, some authorities maintain that the convention cannot
actually obtain money from the treasury except with the cooperation
of the existing officials.54 However, it is interesting to note that the
president of the Pennsylvania Convention of 1789 drew a warrant on
the state treasurer for 100 pounds for the expenses of the convention.15
tion of Oklahoma 74 pages. Some of the older constitutions, e.g., that of Connecticut, occupy only 16 pages of the same volume. These Constitutions, as well as others
which are almost as long, contain provisions about many things which are properly
legislative in character: for example, regulations of primary elections; detailed provisions with respect to the initiative and referendum; provisions relating to retirement
pensions, horse racing, boxing and wrestling; regulations of public utilities; regulations of liquor traffic; and regulations of many other matters too numerous to mention.
52. JAMESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 423 et seq.; DODD, op. cit. supra note 6,
c. 3; Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140 (1937); Opinion of the
Justices, 76 N.H. 612 (1889).
53. 2 Minn. 61, 66 (1858).
54. E.g., Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140 (1937).
55. PROCEFIINGs RELATING TO CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, 144 (1825).
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The validity of this act never came before the courts. The general
rule appears to be that a convention has no inherent power to draw
money from the state treasury, but must depend on the legislature to
make an appropriation for its expenses and to authorize that the money
may be drawn by warrants signed by the president or some other officer
of the convention.5"
A very important question which arises in connection with the
holding of constitutional conventions is who are entitled to membership in such conventions and how must the delegates be chosen. The
justices of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in an advisory opinion
to the governor said:
"A constitutional convention is an assembly of the people
themselves acting through their duly elected delegates. The delegates in such an assembly must therefore come from the people
who choose them for this high purpose and this purpose alone.
They cannot be imposed upon the convention by any other authority. Neither the legislature nor any other department of the
government has the power to select delegates to such a convention. The delegates elected by and from the people, and only such
delegates, may and of right have either a voice or a vote therein."
"No one, not a delegate, no matter how exalted his station in the
existing government, can be assured either a voice or a vote in
such a convention unless he comes there with a commission from
the people as their delegate, although the convention itself may if
it please invite him to address it or give it counsel, in which case
he will be in the convention by invitation and not by virtue of his
office."

17

It is submitted that this statement is sound. A constitutional convention represents the people, and its delegates should be elected by the
people.
Efforts to revise a constitution by commission or to influence the
work of a convention by this means have not met with any great degree
of approval. A commission appointed by the governor or some other
officer of the state is not a convention, and, however ably its work may
be done, it does not ordinarily commend itself to the people. In 1919,
the legislature of Pennsylvania provided for the appointment by the
governor of twenty-five citizens of the Commonwealth to constitute a
Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision. 58 Any
56. See JAmEsoN, op. cit. .ripra note 6, at 436 et seq., and 7 DEBATES OF THE
696 et seq. (1873).

CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA

57. In re The Constitutional Convention, 55 I.L 56, 97-98, 178 At]. 433, 452
(1935). There are other expressions of opinion all in harmony with the one quoted
above: Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 52 (1874); Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113,
36 Pac. 424 (1894); Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1913).
58. Act of June 4, 1919, P.L. 388.
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vacancies in the Commission were to be filled by the governor. It was
provided that the Commission
"should study comprehensively and in detail the provisions of the
present constitution in the light of modern thought and conditions with a special view to the necessity or advisability of changing or admitting any such provisions in order to obtain and secure
for the people of this Commonwealth a form of government best
suited to their needs and most conducive to their welfare." "'
The Commission also was directed to determine whether a revision
should be made by convention or by revising particular sections. It
was duly appointed, was in session several months, and proposed one
hundred eighty-four amendments and the calling of a convention to
make a comprehensive revision. Its proceedings are fully reported in
four volumes." ° In 1921,1 the legislature provided that at the primary
election that year a vote should be taken to determine, whether a constitutional convention should be held and that, if the vote were favorable, three delegates should be elected from each congressional district
within the Commonwealth and twenty-five delegates at large appointed
by the governor. The act further provided that it should be the duty
of the convention "to consider the constitution recommended by 'the
Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision.'" At the
subsequent primary election, the proposal to call a convention under
this act was defeated. The fact that twenty-five delegates were to be
appointed by the governor instead of being elected by the people may
have been a contributing cause. If a convention had been called pursuant to this act, its legality would have been open to serious question.
Efforts in other jurisdictions to revise constitutions by the work
of commissions also have been rather unsuccessful. Commissions to
propose amendments or revisions have been appointed in New York,
Michigan, Maine, New Jersey and Rhode Island.6 2 In Michigan, New
Jersey and Rhode Island, the commissions prepared completely revised
constitutions which the people rejected. However, in some cases recommendations of the commissions were accepted by the people after
modification by the legislature.' In other cases, amendments have been
59. Ibid.

60. Entitled

COMMISSION

ON

CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT

AND

REVISION

(1920).
61. Act of April 27, 1921, P.L. 323.
62. JAMESON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 570-575.
63. The work of the Virginia Commission referred to in Staples v. Gilmer,
supra note 46, was sustained only because of approval by the people and long acquiescence before it came before the courts.
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suggested by unofficial committees of citizens, accepted by legislatures,
6
and, usually after revision, submitted to the people for approval.
The necessity of having delegates who come directly from the
people is so great that it has even been doubted whether the convention has power to fill vacancies in its membership caused by death or
resignatfon.6 The doubt is based principally on the unchallenged fact
that the legislature would have no power to appoint delegates and,
therefore, could not do it indirectly by delegating this power to the
convention when vacancies occurred. In the Pennsylvania Convention
of 1873, one argument against the theory that the convention had supreme power was the fact that many of its members had not been
elected by the people but had been appointed by the other delegates to
fill vacancies. 66 Jameson remarks that the absence of one or more delegates is not a serious evil and that it might be better to leave the
vacancy unfilled than to have a delegate chosen in an illegal manner.
However, the question of filling vacancies is on the borderline between
legislative power and constitution-making power. Acts calling conventions in most cases have provided methods for filling vacancies; a common practice is to select the new delegate from the same district from
which came the delegate who has died or resigned. In view of the inconvenience which would result otherwise, it is probable that the courts
would sustain an act which provided for the election of delegates by
the people and for the filling of vacancies by the convention itself
through issuance of writs for a new election or by appointment from
the district which the former delegate represented.
Finally we come to the question of the extent to which the courts
will interfere with irregular amendments or revisions of a constitution. It has already been noted that the legislature (or a group of
citizens where the initiative and referendum may be used) must comply
strictly with the provisions of the constitution as to the manner in
which specific amendments may be proposed.67 If directions of the
constitution are not followed, the courts have jurisdiction to interfere.
In Ellingham v. Dye,"' the court said:
"Whether legislative action is voided for want of power in that
body or because the constitution's forms or conditions have not
been followed or have been violated may become a judicial question and upon the courts the inevasible duty to determine it falls.
64. The recent amendment of the Constitution of Pennsylvania providing for consolidation of the City and County of Philadelphia was prepared by committees of
citizens.
65. JAMESoN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 331, 333.
66. See Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 52 (1873).
67. Ibid.
68. 178 Ind. 336, 391, 99 N.E. 1, 21 (1912).
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And so the power resides in the courts and they have with practical uniformity exercised the authority to determine the validity
of proposal, submission, or ratification of changes in the organic
law."
In some cases it has been argued that any question as to the validity
of a constitutional amendment is a political one and thus beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts, but this view has not been accepted. There
is no question whatever that the courts may intervene before the proposed amendment has been approved by vote of the people; there is
some difference of opinion as to whether they may do so after the
amendment has been approved, but it is believed that the correct rule
is the one expressed in the opinion just quoted."
It may be added,
however, that the courts have very properly taken the position that
after an amendment has been approved by the people every intendment
will be resolved in favor of its validity.

°

When the case involves the validity of the action of a convention
the judicial attitude is somewhat different. The courts are slow to
interfere with the convention's action. Usually, they will not intervene
while the convention is in session, even though its proceedings might
be deemed unlawful. However, after the convention has finished its
work and prior to approval by the people, that work becomes subject
to the action of the courts.
In Carton v. Secretary of State,71 it was held that a constitutional
convention could not submit its work to the vote of the people at a time
different from that which had previously been fixed by the old constitution. A similar decision was Wells v. Bain 72 where the court enjoined the submission of the work of the Pennsylvania Convention of
1873 to the people in the manner the convention had fixed by ordinance,
that method being contrary to the one prescribed by the enabling act.
69. See also Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, 109 (1854), in which the court said:
"We entertain no doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by
convention, any requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself must be observed and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment."
This rule has been held to cover the counting of the votes. See Rich v. Board
of State Canvassers, 100 Mich. 453, 59 N.W. 181 (1894) ; McConnaghy v. Secretary
of State, 106 Minn. 392, 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
70. See DoDD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 217, where the author observes that when
the courts are opposed to the amendment, they not infrequently find some reason
for declaring that it has been invalidly adopted. For the proposition that the courts
will ordinarily resolve doubt in favor of the validity of amendments which have been
approved by the people, Dodd cites State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379,
110 N.W. 1113 (1907); State v. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. 1, 68 N.E. 574 (1903); May
and Thomas Hardware Co. v. Birmingham, 123 Ala. 306, 26 So. 537 (1899).
71. 151 Mich. 337, 115 N.W. 429 (1908).
72. 75 Pa. 39 (1873).
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Although the courts ordinarily will not interfere with a constitutional convention while it is in session, a case might arise which would
require judicial intervention. If a convention should be illegally constituted (e.g., if delegates were appointed instead of being elected as
required by law or if the legislature were to resolve itself into a constitutional convention), it would seem clear that the proceedings of
that convention should be restrained by the courts even before it had
completed its work. That a constitution prepared by such a convention will be prevented by judicial action from being submitted to the
people for adoption was decided in Ellingham v. Dye.'
However, contrary to the attitude of the courts toward a specific
amendment which has been illegally adopted, the courts ordinarily will
not interfere with a constitution which has been approved by the people
even if illegally formed, particularly if it has been accepted and acted
upon by other departments of the government. The Pennsylvania Convention of 1873 proposed alterations of the Bill of Rights, although
such a proposal was beyond its powers by reason of limitations imposed
by the enabling act and the vote of the people in electing delegates
thereunder. A bill in equity was filed to enjoin the submission of the
constitution to the people. It prayed that the act calling the convention
be declared unconstitutional and that the convention itself be decreed
to be an illegal body and its actions invalid. Various acts were alleged
as the bases of the application to the court, one being that the convention had illegally. proposed to alter the Bill of Rights. The court, rejecting other arguments, conceded that the convention had exceeded its
powers by proposing alterations in the Bill of Rights. However, before the case came before the Supreme Court, the revised constitution
had been submitted to the people and approved by a large majority.
The court, therefore, at the outset of its opinion said:
"The change made by the people in their political institutions, by
the adoption of the proposed Constitution since [the decree of the
court below] forbids an inquiry into the merits of this case. The
question is no longer judicial . . .. " 74
This decision, which in fact upheld a revolutionary change in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, is interesting because it illustrates the truth
of the observation, previously stated, that the courts have been liberal
in sustaining amendments, even though irregularly made, when the
people have approved them either by vote or by acquiescence.
73. 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912). It has already been noted that efforts by
a convention to step outside of its powers by passing acts of legislation or interfering
with the executive department of the state will be enjoined by the courts.
74. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 68 (1874).
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There are other cases which take the same position as the Pennsylvania court, i.e., that if the work of a constitutional convention, although irregularly produced, has been approved or accepted by the
people, the court will refuse to interfere on the ground that a political
question and not a legal question is involved. In Miller v. Johnson,7
a constitutional convention in Kentucky submitted its work to the
people, who approved it. Thereafter, the convention reassembled and
made certain additional alterations in the constitution, which were not
submitted to the voters but were promulgated as part of the constitution. These alterations were accepted and acted under by other departments of the government. When the matter came before the Supreme
Court, it held that the question was not a judicial but a political one,
and dismissed a bill in equity seeking to interfere with those parts of
the constitution alleged to have been illegally adopted. A similar decision was made in Taylor v. Commonwealth, by which the Virginia
court upheld the legality of a constitution because it had been "recognized, accepted and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the
State by the Governor .

.

. by the Legislature," 7' and by others.

The same view was expressed in Staples v. Gilmer,77 in which the
Court of Appeals of Virginia apparently approved a previous revision
of the state constitution because for a period of years it had not been
challenged.
Thus, it appears that after the people have spoken by approving a
revision of the constitution, or even after they have acquiesced in a
change which would have been declared illegal if action had been begun
in time, the courts will not disturb it but will treat the matter as a
political question which has been laid to rest by the action or acquiescence of the people in whom the supreme power always remains. 7
75. 92 Ky. 589, 18 S.W. 522 (1892).
76. 101 Va. 829, 831, 44 S.E. 754, 755 (1903).
77. 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945). See also Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423,
195 P.2d 665 (1948); Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322
(1946); Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613 (1873); Larkin v. Gronna, 69 N.D. 234,
285 N.W. 59 (1939). But see Huff v. Selber, 10 F.2d 236 (W.D. La. 1925).
78. See Taylor v. King, 284 Pa 235, 130 Atl. 407 (1925), in which this rule
was applied to specific amendments, illegally adopted, which had been accepted by the
people.

